Neville Leslie v. Atty Gen USA by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-19-2012 
Neville Leslie v. Atty Gen USA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"Neville Leslie v. Atty Gen USA" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 1202. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/1202 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-2442 
_____________ 
 
NEVILLE SYLVESTER LESLIE, 
                                           Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES; 
MARY SAMBOL, Warden of York County Prison; 
THOMAS DECKER, District Director of Pennsylvania Field 
Office for Detention; JANET NAPOLITANO, Secretary of 
the US Department of Homeland Security 
_____________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the United 
 States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 3:11-cv-0249) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard P. Conaboy 
 
Argued February 6, 2012 
Before:  SLOVITER, VANASKIE and GARTH, Circuit 
Judges. 
 
(Filed: March 19, 2012) 
 
Neville Leslie 
ID #118592 
York County Prison 
3400 Concord Road 
York, PA 17402 
 Pro Se Appellant 
 
Tony West 
David J. Kline 
Victor M. Lawrence 
Flor M. Suarez (Argued) 
2 
 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
United States Department of Justice 
P.O. Box 868, Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, D.C. 20044 
 Counsel for Appellee 
 
Valerie Burch  
ACLU Foundation of Pennsylvania 
105 N. Front St., Suite 225 
Harrisburg, PA 17101 
Counsel for Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties 
Union Foundation of Pennsylvania 
 
Judy Rabinovitz (Argued) 
Michael K.T. Tan 
ACLU Foundation Immigrants’ Rights Project 
125 Broad Street, 18th Floor 
New York, NY 10004 
 Counsel for Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties 
Union Foundation 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Petitioner Neville Leslie, a Jamaican alien, has been 
incarcerated since March 28, 2008 without a bond hearing.  
He now seeks a bond hearing as provided by 8 U.S.C. § 1226, 
contending that his continued detention by United States 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) for four 
years is unconstitutional.1
 
 
 Leslie’s appeal from the District Court’s denial of his 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus reveals a mixture of 
agency and court rulings (detailed below), all of which seek 
his removal to Jamaica and involve the pre-removal statute (8 
                                              
1 With leave of this court, the American Civil Liberties Union 
Foundation and the American Civil Liberties Union 
Foundation of Pennsylvania (“ACLU”) entered this matter as 
amici curiae. 
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U.S.C. § 1226) and the post-removal statute (8 U.S.C. § 
1231).  We now remand to the District Court and reverse the 
denial of Leslie’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  We 
also order that Leslie be afforded a bond hearing no later than 
ten days from the date this opinion and order are filed. 
 
I. 
 
 In 1998, Neville Leslie, a native and citizen of Jamaica 
and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was 
convicted of a felony offense of conspiracy to possess and 
distribute more than fifty grams of “crack” cocaine in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  He was subsequently sentenced 
to 168 months imprisonment, which he has served.  On 
March 28, 2008, after Leslie’s release from prison, ICE 
issued a warrant for Leslie’s arrest and took Leslie into 
custody.  He has been incarcerated under ICE custody since 
that time. 
 
 On April 16, 2008, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) held a 
hearing and found Leslie, who waived his right to counsel at 
the hearing, removable to Jamaica for having committed an 
aggravated felony.  Leslie appealed that order to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).  His appeal was dismissed on 
July 11, 2008.  On July 21, 2008, Leslie petitioned this court 
for review of the BIA’s decision, and he also moved to stay 
his removal on July 24, 2008.  On August 14, 2008, this court 
granted the stay of removal pending the resolution of his 
petition for review.2
 
 
On July 8, 2010, this court, holding that the IJ failed to 
inform Leslie of the availability of free legal counsel, granted 
Leslie’s petition for review and remanded the case to the BIA 
for a new hearing.  On December 10, 2010, the BIA 
                                              
2 The record reveals that on November 16, 2009, a post order 
custody review was held by DHS, which the government 
represents as a “bond hearing.”  Leslie represents, however, 
that he was not present, that a hearing was not held, and that 
he could not pay the $20,000 decreed as bond required.  We 
cannot regard a proceeding at which neither Leslie nor 
counsel representing Leslie was present as a bond hearing. 
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remanded the case to the IJ, who scheduled a hearing for 
February 22, 2011. 
 
While still engaged before the immigration authorities 
and while still awaiting the immigration hearing of February 
22, 2011, on February 2, 2011, Leslie filed a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania, challenging his continued 
immigration detention without hearing.   
 
First, Leslie claimed that his original conviction was 
not an “aggravated felony,” and that he therefore was not 
subject to criminal detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226.  Section 
1226 concerns the arrest, detention, and release of aliens who 
have not yet been ordered to be removed, and, among other 
things, authorizes a bond hearing.  Leslie also argued that his 
detention was unconstitutionally lengthy and that his 
continued detention without a bond hearing violated his 
procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.   
 
 Before Leslie’s habeas corpus petition was ruled on 
by the District Court, the IJ held the scheduled February 22, 
2011 hearing, where Leslie requested a continuance of his 
removal proceedings for “medical reasons.”  The IJ continued 
the proceedings until March 30, 2011, at which time another 
hearing was held.  At that hearing, Leslie again challenged 
the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and again argued that 
his prior conviction was not an “aggravated felony.”  The IJ 
concluded that the prior conviction was an aggravated felony 
and did not decide the constitutional question of unreasonable 
detention.  The IJ therefore ordered that Leslie be removed to 
Jamaica.  Leslie appealed this decision to the BIA.   
 
The BIA remanded Leslie’s appeal of the IJ’s order of 
removal to the IJ, noting that the audio recording of the 
March 30, 2011 hearing and the audio recording of the 
immigration judge’s oral decision were missing from the 
record.  The BIA therefore ordered the immigration judge to 
prepare a complete transcript of the March 30, 2011 
proceedings and, if necessary, to hold a new hearing.   
 
Meanwhile, on May 10, 2011, the District Court 
adopted a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation 
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which recommended denying Leslie’s petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus “without prejudice to future requests when, and 
if, Leslie’s continued detention becomes sufficiently 
prolonged to trigger constitutional concerns.”  The District 
Court then held that Leslie had been convicted of an 
aggravated felony and that his detention was not 
unreasonable.  Leslie timely appealed the denial of his 
petition to this court, which we address today. 
 
Leslie was ordered removed by the IJ on December 15, 
2011.  Leslie appealed this order of removal to the BIA on 
December 22, 2011, and on February 3, 2012, DHS requested 
that the BIA expedite that appeal.  As of this time, Leslie’s 
appeal is still pending before the BIA, and Leslie’s detention 
is continuing without Leslie having been afforded a bond 
hearing. 
 
II. 
 
 This appeal requires us to resolve a single issue: 
whether the District Court properly determined that Leslie’s 
continued detention is reasonable, and that he is therefore not 
entitled to a bond hearing.3
                                              
3 Leslie also argues that the District Court erred in referring 
his habeas petition to a magistrate judge to prepare a report 
and recommendation.  Leslie claims, inter alia, that the 
referral to a magistrate judge for a report and 
recommendation violated his due process rights because he 
did not consent to it and that the District Court abused its 
discretion in adopting that report and recommendation.  This 
argument is without merit; Local Rule 73.1(d) for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania provides that civil cases “may be 
referred to a magistrate judge at the time of the filing of the 
complaint under the rotational assignment plan of the court 
and, at the same time, will be assigned to a district court 
judge.  The magistrate judge, independent of the parties’ 
consent, is authorized to exercise all the judicial authority that 
is provided for by law for a magistrate judge.”  Further, under 
Local Rule 72.3, after a magistrate judge issues a report and 
recommendation, the parties have an opportunity to file 
objections to it.  Thereafter, under Local Rule 72.3, the 
District Court judge to whom the case is assigned must “make 
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 We begin by reviewing the statutory framework under 
which aliens can be detained during and subsequent to 
removal proceedings: 
 
Under the pre-removal statute—8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)—
ICE can detain any alien pending a decision in removal 
proceedings against that alien, and can release on bond any 
alien not otherwise ineligible for such release.  Section 1226 
expressly provides for mandatory detention during removal 
proceedings of aliens who are removable on account of their 
commission of certain enumerated offenses, including 
aggravated felonies such as Leslie’s.  Once removal 
proceedings terminate in an order of removal, however, the 
alien’s detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a).   
 
Under the post-removal statute—8 U.S.C. § 1231—
ICE must remove the alien within 90 days of a final order of 
removal, and must detain the alien during that period.  Certain 
removable aliens, including aliens who, like Leslie, are 
removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for having 
committed an aggravated felony “may be detained beyond the 
removal period” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). 
 
                                                                                                     
a de novo determination of those portions of the report or 
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which 
objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole 
or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the 
magistrate judge.”   
 
In this case, Leslie’s petition was assigned to Judge 
Conaboy and referred to Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson.  
After Magistrate Judge Carlson issued his report and 
recommendation, Leslie made objections to it, and Judge 
Conaboy properly considered de novo those portions of the 
recommendation to which those objections pertained.  All of 
the procedural requirements for referral to a magistrate judge 
were properly followed below; no consent from Leslie was 
required to allow the magistrate judge to prepare his report 
and recommendation, nor did Judge Conaboy abuse his 
discretion in adopting Magistrate Judge Carlson’s report and 
recommendation. 
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 Because detention under § 1231(a) serves to detain for 
removal an alien who will in fact be subjected to removal, the 
Supreme Court has held that the extended mandatory 
detention provided for by § 1231(a)(6) is constitutional only 
if it is not indefinite and when a “significant likelihood of 
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future” exists.  
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001).  In contrast, the 
Supreme Court did not expressly place any limits on ICE’s 
authority to detain aliens prior to a final order under § 1226.  
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003). 
 
 This court, however, in considering Zadvydas, has 
determined that § 1226 “authorizes detention for a reasonable 
amount of time, after which the authorities must make an 
individualized inquiry into whether detention is still necessary 
to fulfill the statute’s purposes of ensuring that an alien 
attends removal proceedings and that his release will not pose 
a danger to the community.”  Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 
656 F.3d 221, 231 (3d Cir. 2011).4
 
  The court in Diop further 
noted that determining the point at which the length of 
detention is no longer reasonable is “a fact-dependent inquiry 
that will vary depending on individual circumstances.  We 
decline to establish a universal point at which detention will 
always be considered unreasonable.”  Id. at 233.  The fact-
dependent inquiry must take into account delay caused by 
errors which necessitated appeals as well as the extent to 
which continuances or other delays favorable to the alien 
have lengthened the period of detention.  Id. at 233-34.   
 The Diop court began its “reasonableness” analysis 
with the observation that “detention under § 1226 lasts 
roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of cases in 
which it is invoked, and about five months in the minority of 
cases in which an alien chooses to appeal.”  Id. (Internal 
quotation marks and internal citations omitted).  The court 
then observed that Diop had been detained for 35 months, and 
concluded that such a period of time, approximately six times 
longer than the regular period of detention, was unreasonable.  
                                              
4 Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 231 (3d Cir. 
2011) was not filed until after the District Court judge in this 
case had rendered his opinion, so that he could not have 
known about our analysis. 
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Furthermore, as here, the government in Diop argued that the 
alien was responsible for a significant portion of that delay 
because he had requested continuances and filed several 
appeals.  The Diop court concluded that as a general principle 
“the reasonableness determination must take into account a 
given individual detainee’s need for more or less time, as well 
as the exigencies of a particular case,” id. at 234, even though 
Diop concluded that the government and the courts were 
primarily responsible for the delay in Diop’s case. 
 
In other words, Diop laid out a two step-process: a 
reviewing court must first determine that a detention has been 
unreasonably long, and following such a determination, must 
determine whether the unreasonable detention is necessary to 
fulfill §1226’s purposes as outlined in Diop, supra. 
 
 Because detention under the two statutes is governed 
by different standards, we must determine which statute has 
provided the authority for Leslie’s detention at a given time.  
The government argues that the two years for which Leslie 
was detained while this court stayed his removal were 
governed under the post-removal statute (§ 1231), and 
accordingly, that in assessing the reasonableness of Leslie’s 
detention, that time should not be considered.  Leslie and the 
amici contend that his detention during that time was 
governed by the pre-removal statute, § 1226.  We agree with 
Leslie and amici.5
 
 
 The government’s position on Leslie’s habeas petition 
is out of step with other jurisdictions and with the reasoning 
of Diop.  Our review indicates that every circuit to consider 
the issue has held that § 1226, not § 1231, governs detention 
during a stay of removal.  See Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 
F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2008); Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130 
(2d Cir. 2003); Beijani v. INS, 271 F.3d 670 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(abrogated on other grounds by Fernandez-Vargas v. 
Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 (2006)).  But see also Akinwale v. 
Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050 (11th Cir. 2002) (assuming that § 
                                              
5 Judge Sloviter concurs in the result of the majority opinion 
and states: “I note with concern the failure of the Attorney 
General to cite 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b)(8) or to discuss its 
applicability, if any, to the issues before us.” 
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1231 governs detention during a four month judicial stay of 
removal without analysis or discussion).  Furthermore, insofar 
as the purpose of § 1231 detention is to secure an alien 
pending the alien’s certain removal, § 1231 cannot explain 
nor authorize detention during a stay of removal pending 
further judicial review. 
 
Moreover, the express language of § 1231 refers only 
to detention “during” and “beyond” “the removal period.”  
The removal period refers to the 90 day period between a 
statutorily specified event that begins the period and the time 
that the alien must in fact be removed.  Section 
1231(a)(1)(b)(ii) enumerates the events that can begin a 
“removal period,” a list that includes: “If the removal order is 
judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the removal 
of the alien, [the date that begins the removal period is] the 
date of the court’s final order.”  With this language in place, 
there can be little doubt that an alien, subject to and within a 
stay of removal, cannot yet be in the “removal period” for 
§1231 purposes. 
 
Leslie is currently detained “pre-removal” pursuant to 
§ 1226.  Having determined that Leslie was also detained 
under § 1226 during the stay of his removal, Leslie has been 
continually detained pursuant to § 1226 since March 28, 
2008, a period of nearly four full years.  The Diop framework 
guides our inquiry into whether detention under that statute is 
reasonable. 
 
 A comparison of Leslie’s detention to Diop’s makes 
clear that Leslie’s detention is unreasonable.  In the present 
case, Leslie has been detained over a year longer than Diop 
had been.  Although Leslie has requested and received a 
single continuance during that time, that continuance lasted 
for approximately five weeks, and cannot credibly be 
considered as a factor in the length of his detention.  To the 
extent that his detention has exceeded the expected five 
month period for an appealed removal case, that extra time 
has been the result of appeals in which Leslie has prevailed; 
his initial appeal to this court was pending for nearly two 
years.  Following this court’s order in that appeal, Leslie’s 
next hearing was not scheduled for almost seven months, and 
following that hearing, approximately six months passed 
10 
 
during the pendency of Leslie’s appeal to the BIA, which was 
delayed and ultimately remanded for further proceedings, due 
entirely to clerical errors made by the immigration judge.  
“Although an alien may be responsible for seeking relief, he 
is not responsible for the amount of time that such 
determinations may take.”  Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 272 
(6th Cir. 2003). 
 
 In short, over the course of his nearly four year 
detention, Leslie is responsible for a five week delay for 
unspecified medical reasons, and for the delay caused by his 
pursuit of bona fide legal challenges to his removal.  To 
conclude that Leslie’s voluntary pursuit of such challenges 
renders the corresponding increase in time of detention 
reasonable, would “effectively punish [Leslie] for pursuing 
applicable legal remedies,”  Oyedeji v. Ashcroft, 332 F. Supp. 
2d 747, 753 (M.D. Pa. 2004), and we decline the 
government’s invitation to adopt such a position. 
 
We therefore hold that Leslie’s detention is 
unreasonably long, and he is therefore entitled to “an 
individualized inquiry into whether detention is still necessary 
to fulfill the statute’s purposes of ensuring that an alien 
attends removal proceedings and that his release will not pose 
a danger to the community.”  Diop, 656 F.3d at 231.6
 
 
III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s order 
denying Leslie’s petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus will be 
reversed, and Leslie’s appeal will be remanded to the District 
Court with instructions to conduct an individualized bond 
hearing as required by Diop within ten days of the date when 
this opinion and order are filed. 
                                              
6 See footnote 4 of this opinion. 
